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A ‘good, average man’: calculation and the limits of statistics in enrolling insurance 
customers 
Abstract Drawing upon the historical relationship between statistics, probabilistic reasoning 
and life insurance, the article argues that mathematical calculation played a necessary but 
limited role in making markets for life insurance. Insuring publics have been fairly 
consistently cautious in the use of probabilistic and statistical reasoning to inform investment 
in life insurance. In this they follow a pattern set by early insurance companies who 
themselves were slow to alter their commercial practices in line with emerging knowledge. I 
examine some of the reasons for this glacial pace and some of the ambiguities on which 
statistical ‘certainties’ were built as part of an argument that the role of statistics and 
mathematics in market calculation is both less and more than it seems. This is manifest in the 
history of industrial life assurance, an industry with a phenomenally successful track record in 
the mass enrolment of consumers. Unlike their predecessors, industrial companies disdained 
swamping their target markets with probabilistic arguments in favour of a very different sort 
of argument that, nevertheless, carried a trace of statistical thinking with it. This trace came in 
the form of ‘good, average men’, the agents who became industrial insurance’s core 
marketing device and who translated the essentials of a statistically informed product into a 
more palatable, more calculable form. 
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Figure 1 ‘A new solution of a problem in insurance of money on lives’ 1807, (JJ) 
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The above is an extract from an 1807 publication ‘A new solution of a problem in insurance 
of money on lives’ by the presumably pseudonymous author ‘Philalethes Cantabrigiensis’ 
(JJ). The solution requires another three stages of argument to demonstrate what ‘will appear 
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to any competent judge of these matters’ viz that the calculations of the most celebrated 
writers on this branch of mathematics ‘are grounded on an erroneous principle’. That 
principle involves taking the value of chance in the first 1/10 of the year as equivalent to its 
value in the last 1/10 of the year. It is not part of my ambition to establish whether or not 
Cantabrigensis’ confessed excitement at his discovery was justified. Rather my aim is to show 
that mathematical argument, whether competent or incompetent, could never be sufficient by 
itself to foster life assurance markets.  
As tricky as early nineteenth century arguments that commercial risk practices should be 
more closely aligned with the emerging principles of probability and statistics undoubtedly 
were; the concrete problem of enrolling people as consumers of life assurance was trickier 
still. To make matters more perplexing, probability and statistics were put to work by 
insurance companies in an attempt to solve the latter problem well in advance of their 
effective use for the commercial calculation of risk. In short, while insurance companies were 
loudly extolling the scientific ‘certainties’ on which their business was based, by a range of 
measures these ‘certainties’ were anything but. As Augustus De Morgan’s 1837 review of 
Laplace’s Théorie Analytique des Probabilités observes, there were very few people 
competent to judge either Laplace’s methods or his results and even fewer able to judge both. 
 
It might appear to be our intention to decry the work which we have placed at the head of this 
article. Now, even meaning by the world the mathematical world, there is not a sufficient 
proportion of that little public which has read the work in question, to raise any such collective 
sound as a cry either on one side or the other. […] The pure theorist has no immediate occasion 
for the results, as results, and therefore contents himself in many instances with a glance at the 
processes, ... The practical observer and experimenter obtains a knowledge of results and nothing 
more, will [sic] knowing in most cases, that the analysis is above his reach. We could number 
upon the finders [sic] of one hand, all the men we know in Europe who have used the results in 
their published writings in a manner which makes it clear that they could both use and 
demonstrate. (1837, p9, my insertion) 
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The scarcity of people who could both use and demonstrate probability theory and 
statistical reasoning and results, whether or not in relation to insurance, I suggest, was not just 
a freak of the pioneer period. Over time, this reluctance or inability to use probabilistic and 
statistical reasoning to inform an understanding of life insurance has some claim to continuity 
as a characteristic of the insuring public. In this article I explore the relationship between 
knowledges of probability and statistics and the commercial practices adopted by life 
insurance companies particularly those specialising in industrial insurance. The industrial 
offices are interesting because they represent a phenomenally successful mass enrolment of 
consumers in a part of the business which, by the end of the nineteenth century, was indeed 
grounded in probabilistic and statistical calculation, yet made little of it in its marketing. 
Industrial companies disdained swamping their target markets with probabilistic arguments in 
favour of a different sort of argument, which, nevertheless, carried an idea, a faint trace, of 
statistical thinking with it. This trace came in the form of ‘good, average men’, the collecting 
agents who became not only a marketing device but an effective means of market framing by 
which the essentials of a statistically informed product were translated into a more palatable, 
even a more calculable form. 
The article begins with an overview of the historical relationship between insurance, 
statistics and probability to establish its extent but also its limits. It then goes one to review 
the trouble with probability and statistics both methodologically and in relation to the 
marketing challenge posed by life assurance. This is followed by a discussion of how agents 
as extraordinarily successful, systematically cultivated, devices for the enrolment of 
consumers addressed the marketing challenge. The significance of agents’ achievement 
should not be understated. The history of industrial life assurance contains an object lesson in 
mass consumer enrolment in what, by many measures, was an off-putting, complicated and 
expensive product, but one which nonetheless easily outclassed a series of state sponsored 
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alternatives. Fundamentally, industrial insurance flourished because its proponents understood 
that even the most technical, most quantitative financial product, had also to engage the 
passions.  
 
Insurance, statistics and probability 
 
‘And so the poor gentleman’s dead sir! Ah! The more’s the pity.’ … ‘But it’s what we all must 
come to. It’s as certain as being born, except we can’t make our calculations as exact.’ (Mrs 
Gamp in Martin Chuzzlewit, Dickens, 1994, p306) 
 
Nineteenth century commercial insurance, as has been ably demonstrated elsewhere, had 
some part in promoting the idea that large numbers would behave in accordance with 
discoverable laws, that chance could be ‘tamed’ (Hacking, 1990, Porter, 1996). Commercial 
insurance may have acted, as Gigerenzer et al. (1989) note, as the first practical and market 
test of statistical and probabilistic models, but this does not mean that the relationship 
between them was ever straightforward. As neat as the fit may appear, it is certainly not the 
case that commercial insurance, grew, in any simple sense, out of the developing knowledges 
of statistics and probability.  
There are a number of reasons for this but perhaps the most interesting relates to the 
peculiar history of insurance. The fact that commercial insurance practices came into closer 
alignment with statistical and probabilistic modelling as the nineteenth century progressed is 
only one, albeit significant, dimension of this history. Ewald’s (1991) definition of insurance 
as a technology that compensates for the effects of chance through the mechanism of 
mutuality organised according to the laws of large numbers may capture the essentials but it 
also skates over the strange and varied ways insurance has been made to work. Insurance may 
be a technical method of risk spreading, it may be more or less efficient depending on the 
technical and methodological arrangements employed, but it is also more than this. As far as 
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its publics, its consumers are concerned; insurance is a promise –one that strikes at the heart 
of making the world liveable. As the American poet and insurance underwriter Wallace 
Stevens put it. 
 
The significance of a business is not wholly an affair of its statistics. … The objective of all of us 
is to live in a world where nothing unpleasant can happen. Our prime instinct is to go on 
indefinitely like the wax flowers on the mantelpiece. Insurance is the most easily understood 
geometry for calculating how to bring the thing about. (in Wertheimer, 2006, xi)  
 
Discussing Stevens, Wertheimer argues that to everyday policyholders, insurance 
promises a world of irreversible value, where nothing need ever be lost, a fantasy of a 
replaceable totality. The promise doesn’t bear much scrutiny of course. The effects of death, 
accidents, even theft, are not recoverable - no matter how comprehensive, how ‘like-for like’ 
the cover, something remains lost. In promising what it can’t entirely deliver insurance stands 
in a peculiar relationship to the inevitability of loss and change. Charles Sanders Peirce 
doomily notes that according to the doctrine of chances, the time must come when an 
insurance company’s losses will bring it to a stop in the same way ‘as every good fortune, as 
every human dynasty, as every human civilisation’ (1998, p 72) eventually breaks down.  
Insurance, historically, is imagined as a response to loss and change, to fortune and 
accident, life and death. This lends insurance a stubborn taint of the metaphysical even while 
it works to distribute and price risk. Perhaps unique among mass-marketed consumer goods, 
insurance derives from ties of love, fear and security in peculiar combination with the 
relations of chance, risk and logic. But a foundation in chance, risk and logic is not the same 
as a foundation in statistics and probabilistic reasoning. While many writers have emphasized 
the far-reaching significance of the introduction of statistically informed insurance techniques 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, insurance had by then, as Gigerenzer et al. (1989) 
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and Clark (1999) document, been carrying on a lively trade with little reference to such 
techniques for well over a century.  
Intriguingly, it was not ignorance of mortality statistics that left early offices to ply their 
trade as best they could without them. Halley’s table setting out the average continuance of 
life at different ages had first appeared in 1693, mortality bills were thereafter widely 
disseminated in publications like the Gentleman’s Magazine and there was a determined 
move amongst probabilists to rationalise commercial risk taking (Clark, 1999; Gigerenzer et 
al., 1989). Yet it was another 70 years before the Equitable became the first company to use 
mortality tables to inform the introduction of graduated policy premiums, while older 
companies, notably London Assurance and the Royal Exchange, resisted for a further few 
decades. Clark accounts for this long hiatus contextually.  
 
Early life assurance promoters and their customers fully appreciated the significance of the 
mortality statistics derived by the political arithmeticians and made reasonable and limited use of 
them. The findings of the new demography did not in fact fall on deaf ears, partly because they 
did not possess the immediate and overwhelming persuasiveness that many historians have 
attributed to statistical knowledge. Instead, a statistical approach… competed with entrenched, 
and often credible, popular beliefs about mortality patterns – beliefs to which even the 
probabilists and statisticians themselves sometimes subscribed. (1999, p.118) 
 
In the early eighteenth century, statistics were a means of knowing but it was by no 
means clear that they were a superior means. Given the limits of the available mortality 
statistics and the specific risks of insuring the volatile urban population of eighteenth century 
London, companies developed alternate technical means of managing their risks by limiting 
the insured population and diversifying their investments (Clark, 1999). That eighteenth 
century insurance was ‘done’ largely without the available statistics does not mean it was 
done in wilful ignorance of an obvious improvement. As Desrosieres (1998), Gigerenzer et al. 
(1989) and Porter (1996) have painstakingly explained the easy trust in numbers, statistics and 
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probabilistic reasoning characteristic of the last 150 years or so, was not a foregone 
conclusion but the result of a process. This is the case partly because competent judges of 
emerging modes of reasoning are always few and those that exist often differ. Trust in 
numbers also required a much broader set of changes in the practices of science and 
experimentation away from the private and mysterious patterns of the seventeenth century to 
the more public, institutionalised and open arrangements which prevailed in the nineteenth 
century. That experimental scientific results, witnessed and understood by very few, came to 
be accepted as accurate or true by many, in Porter’s (1996, p.15) account was a ‘triumph of 
rhetoric’, an outcome, in part, of the increasing refinement of ‘technologies of trust’. After a 
slow start, the insurance industry by the mid-nineteenth century was a keen but, 
unsurprisingly, interested, participant in this exercise. 
By 1809 when Cantabrigensis published his solution, London Assurance had introduced 
graduated premiums based on age at entry and the industry had accumulated some experience 
in using mortality statistics to price premiums. This might have been expected to produce a 
substantial boost to the market. The use of more accurate mortality statistics was ultimately to 
reduce premium prices, and reveal the solvency of companies like the Equitable to have been 
based partly on overpricing (cf. de Morgan, 1837, Alborn, 2002). This in turn helped bring 
life insurance within the reach of a much larger market among the middle classes. But the 
shift from the peculiar mix of speculation and prudence that had characterised the industry in 
the eighteenth century to the actuarially enhanced nineteenth century form took some time to 
achieve. In 1805 there were only 5 companies, all London based, offering life insurance and 
only a further 15 by 1820; the big boom waited until the 1830s with as many as 50 new 
companies springing up each decade between then and the 1870s (Alborn, 2009). This growth 
marked a period of trouble as well as one of expansion. The majority of these newly formed 
companies were fuelled by stock market speculation and proved very temporary concerns. 
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Others were the sort of rotten or incompetent enterprises exemplified by the Great 
Middlesex’s notorious swindle of 1836, itself the likely inspiration for Dicken’s spectacularly 
corrupt Anglo-Bengalee Disinterested Loan and Life Assurance Company in Martin 
Chuzzlewit.  
This pattern of rapid expansion and equally rapid failure was symptomatic of the 
unsettled state of the industry and its still unresolved relationship with actuarialism. By 
indicators such as new start-ups, technical innovations and potential market growth the 
industry was burgeoning but growth amongst the middle and lower middle classes was slower 
than predicted and slower than those reformers and advocates who saw life assurance as a 
means to social improvement had hoped. As De Morgan’s (1838, p5) essay put it despite its 
growth, the capital invested in insurance was ‘trifling compared with what will be the case 
when its principles are better understood’. This slow pace of growth is not that surprising 
given that insurance companies were trying to promote a product that was not only technically 
demanding but emotionally laden and, at least in some contexts, morally and ethically 
challenging (McFall, 2007). Added to this was the burden of trying to maintain the reputation 
of an industry against a series of notorious scandals, frauds and failures. Probability, statistics 
and actuarial science in this context were seized upon as much as a rhetorical as a technical 
solution. What interested insurance companies, was not simply what emerging techniques 
could actually do, but what they could be claimed to do.  
By the middle of the century references to the certainties offered by a new understanding 
of the effect of statistical laws were standard fare in promotional matter and in the thriving 
insurance press. Typical of the tone, the first issue of the Life Assurance Chronicle in 1846 
directed its readers to the ‘extensive fund of very valuable information’ to be found in the 
Annual Report of the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in England and to 
the material as well as the intellectual advantages to be had from studying the laws uncovered 
 11 
by this ‘higher branch of knowledge’. This knowledge, insurance press and publicity 
repeatedly claimed, effectively underwrote the life assurance business.  
 
Life assurance as a system is based on the fact that human life, proverbially the most uncertain of 
all things, yet follows, in the aggregate, a fixed law … while we cannot tell how long any one 
man may live, we are enabled, by the study of mortality, to predict with singular exactness how 
many men out of any large body will die in each year until all the lives are extinct. (Scottish 
Amicable, prospectus 1876, MS 18262, GH) 
 
Such reflections were not that far removed from those of Mrs Gamp at the head of this 
section. As both midwife and layer-out of the dead, attendant at the extreme poles of life, Mrs 
Gamp has some claim to expertise. That she has nothing more insightful to say is a mark of 
Dickens’ impatience with the inflated claims insurance companies routinely made about their 
grounding in statistical laws. What Dickens in his relentless parody of the Anglo-Bengalee 
grasped, was the Olympian leap between the claims of law-like regularities uncovered by 
statistics and probabilistic reasoning, and the claims to safety on the basis of such regularities. 
By the first decades of the nineteenth century there was a relationship between insurance 
company practice and statistical knowledge. Companies did use mortality statistics to price 
their premiums and they did use probabilistic and actuarial calculations to forecast their 
liabilities. But statistics did not, perhaps could not, offer the kind of financial guarantees that 
company publicity implicitly promised. Companies wilfully overstated the certainties 
promised by statistics and probabilistic reasoning and glossed over the real and salient 
distinction between the populations they insured and the population from which the mortality 
tables they used were drawn.  
In doing so companies were merely demonstrating the sort of appetite for statistical laws 
that Hacking (1990) describes in the proceedings of the 1825 Select Committee to Consider 
the Laws Respecting the Friendly Societies. Here the need for a more accurate means of 
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pricing Friendly Societies’ premiums translated into a determination to define the laws 
governing sickness rates; a determination which persisted despite a lack of reasonable 
evidence to support it as part of a growing conviction that fixed rates of sickness, like 
mortality, did indeed exist. This conviction was not matched by a scientific consensus. His 
investigation into sickness rates under the auspices of the Committee led John Finlaison, the 
chief actuary at the National Debt Office, to conclude that he was not only unconvinced by 
the data evidencing fixed rates of sickness but by a law of mortality itself. 
Irrespective of whether fixed laws of mortality exist, insurance company practice in 
regard to such laws at the time smacked more of hope and promise than of mathematical 
certainty. For one thing, insurance companies relied primarily on Price’s eighteenth century 
Northampton tables which overestimated mortality, placing life expectancy at birth, someway 
south of the Biblical estimate, at 24. But even if insurance companies had drawn upon more 
accurate tables this would not have altered the fact that the local population that any company 
agreed to insure was not equivalent to any general population from which mortality tables 
could have been drawn. As the newly formed Institute of Actuaries had it in 1852, a ‘fixed’ 
rate of mortality and a ‘fixed’ rate of sickness were ‘evidently untenable’ notions, such rates 
would most likely differ in every insurance association ‘not widely perhaps but 
characteristically’ (Cited in Porter, 1996, p38).  
For this reason, companies needed good rules to inform selection of which lives merited 
insurance and expert professional management at least as much as they needed mortality 
statistics. Sound insurance company practice, according to nineteenth century actuaries’ 
testimony, was about selection and judgement not mathematical certainty. Yet it is 
mathematical certainty with which twentieth century actuaries have been most readily 
associated. It was also insurance, until quite recently, that stood as the market exemplar of the 
accuracy of statistical and probabilistic reasoning. It may be still too soon to tell whether 
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upheavals, such as the collapse of the Equitable, with its now ironic but historically well-
deserved reputation for excessive caution, and the seismic failures of mathematical 
calculation underlying recent financial crises, will produce any lasting disturbance in the 
expansion of what Gigerenzer et al. in 1989 called the ‘empire of chance’. These failures may 
be hard to ignore but the faith that chance could be tamed by probabilistic reasoning has 
already long prevailed over available evidence that mathematical calculation has its limits. 
Nineteenth century actuaries may have defended their professional standing as independent 
experts making reasoned judgements as well as technical calculations but the commercially 
convenient ‘myth of actuarial perfection’ has long over-shadowed this description of the work 
(Glenn, 2000).  
This peculiar situation is typical of the ambiguities and tensions in the relationship 
between technical method and commercial practice. The fit between them is good, the former 
clearly informs the latter, but a good fit is not a perfect one. In the matter of technique, 
context, approximations and judgements, remain significant. Gigerenzer et al. offer a neat 
example. 
 
Life insurance is the oldest form of mathematically based insurance and the one best fortified 
with data and techniques. But even that warhorse of the trade, the mortality table, cannot be 
constructed from the data without a modicum of judgement and a good eye. Graphing the 
mortality figures yields an irregular scatter of points, not a smooth curve, from which the actuary 
extracts a mortality curve by ‘graduation techniques’ – ie by drawing a curve freehand through 
the cloud of points. This is a tricky business, for the curve must strike a balance between the 
regularity expected and the ‘indications’ that new trends have emerged, and the only 
qualification for making such nice distinctions is long experience in the business. (1989, p256)  
 
As clearly as the role of judgement can be traced, the myth of actuarial perfection is not 
to be corrected simply by augmenting the objective work of probabilistic and statistical 
calculation with subjective judgement. A better understanding of the relationship between 
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insurance, probability and statistics involves acknowledging not just the ground separating 
subjective and objective methods, but also the ground they share. Insurance, in combining 
chance, love and logic, hints at the deep connections between the history of probability and 
that of metaphysics. The standing of probabilistic, mathematical and statistical reasoning as 
objective is a notable accomplishment not just because it took decades of rhetoric and 
rearrangements to achieve, but because the preoccupations of early probabilists were 
themselves metaphysical. Until well into the nineteenth century, the absence of disciplinary 
boundaries between the natural and social sciences meant there was little to prevent thinkers 
like Charles Sander Peirce and Gabriel Tarde from straying from mathematics to biology to 
sociology, linguistics, philosophy and back. But for eighteenth century classical probabilists, 
matters were even more mixed in an approach that combined a subjective, theological faith in 
intelligent design, order and harmony with a fluid sense of probability that permitted objective 
frequencies.  
Classical probability theory sprang directly from the beliefs and conduct of reasonable 
men – it did not presuppose a prior, independent mathematical theory. For Laplace, 
probability was ‘only good sense reduced to a calculus’ (in Gigerenzer, 1989, p13) and 
modelling good sense was a serious mathematical preoccupation. This determination to model 
reasonableness of course ran up against the fact that reasonableness varies contextually even 
among the select, enlightened ‘hommes éclairés’ –reasonableness in judges is distinct from 
that in merchants – but it also ran up against the conflicting demands of describing versus 
prescribing reasonable conduct. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French 
Revolution had shaken any faith in a single, shared standard of reasonableness and reason 
began to be identified instead with ‘unanalyzable intuitions and sensibility’ (Gigerenzer, 
1989, p35). The bonds linking the subjective and objective within classical probability also 
came apart in this shift, and in the ‘avalanche of numbers’ (Hacking, 1990) flowing from 
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government offices across Europe, conditions were ripe for a hard distinction between 
‘subjective judgement’ and  ‘objective calculation’ and a model shift from the reasonable man 
to the average man. 
 
Un Homme Moyen?: statistics and anti-statistics 
 
Brussels, 21 February 1844 Another question of the highest importance presents itself here. One 
may ask if there exists, in a people, un homme type, a man who represents this people by height, 
and in relation to which all other men of the same nation must be considered as offering 
deviations that are more or less large. The numbers that one would have, on measuring the latter, 
would be grouped around the mean, in the same way as the numbers one would obtain, if the 
same typical man had been measured a large number of times by more or less imprecise 
methods. (Quetelet, in Hacking, 1990, p105) 
 
Until this point, if life assurance was informed by probability theory, it was in the 
classical mould favoured by De Morgan, one of the last adherents to a definition of 
probability as the ‘feeling of the mind, not the inherent property of a set of circumstances’ 
(1838, p7). By mid century this approach was increasingly, and epithetically, termed 
‘subjective’ in contrast to the ‘frequentist’, ‘objective’ view by then in the ascendant (cf 
Gigerenzer, 1989). Again, though, the subjective tag is misleading. For De Morgan 
probability was not a question of personal belief but it arose in the ‘logical relation between 
evidence and reasonable degrees of belief’ (Hacking, 1990, p127). While probabilists over the 
last 150 years or so may have veered more to one side, the objective, than the other, most 
accept that probability remains ‘Janus-faced’ with both objective and subjective sides in an 
irreducible relation between relative frequencies and degrees of belief (Gigerenzer, 1989, 
p274). 
Irreducibly related or not, the tide had turned away from attempting to marry these two 
dimensions by the time John Venn nailed the fundamental conception of probability in 1866 
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in frequentist terms as concerning a series ‘which combines individual irregularity with 
aggregate regularity’ (Hacking, 1990, p126). This shift in probability theory was informed 
and fed by the nineteenth century appetite for statistics. Legislators and companies alike were 
interested in statistics because statistics had already begun to achieve standing as a form of 
evidence so compellingly objective as to be almost incontrovertible. In contrast to probability 
theory, there was little ambiguity in the statistical commitment to objectivity, as the London 
Statistical Society put it, ‘the first and most essential rule’ was ‘to exclude all opinions’ (in 
Gigerenzer et al. 1989, p 38). By adopting a statistical approach, individual intuitions and 
sensibilities could be set aside as irrelevant distractions in favour of an investigation of the 
hidden causes behind patterns discernible in large numbers. This looked like the means to a 
social science which could ‘see’ and analyse individuals through society. 
It was this project that drove Adolphe Quetelet in his effort to make ‘l’homme moyen’ 
not l’homme eclaire the centre of analysis. Quetelet, an astronomer by training, saw in human 
behaviour the same sort of regularities he observed in heavenly bodies and it was human, 
social laws he was after. ‘Man’, Quetelet pronounced, ‘is born, grows up, and dies, according 
to certain laws that have never been studied” (in Menand, 2002, p187). Quetelet’s mission 
was to identify how these laws translated into the mechanical rules of rational belief and 
action manifest in the conduct of the ‘average man’. By mapping characteristics like height, 
weight, education, mortality, suicide etc. Quetelet aimed to use statistics to define 
probabilistic ‘penchants’ for certain acts. The average man, was not a ‘human’ but a ‘national’ 
average and therein lay the basis of the idea that races could be objectively measured by the 
physical and moral qualities of their average type. As I aim to make clear below, nothing of 
the fictive basis, the unsavouriness, or the implausibility of the ‘average man’ has stood in the 
way of its enduring utility in all sorts of arguments. 
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This utility stems from Quetelet’s inspired replacement of the idea that precision 
required a single absolute value with a new technique for quantifying errors. Through this 
technique, the bell-shaped curve generated by the law of errors, was to be applied to social 
phenomena. In order to grasp just how peculiar his statistical objectification of the average 
man is, it is worth exploring how Quetelet got there more closely. One route to the bell-
shaped curve comes from the binomial distribution resulting, for example, from coin-tossing, 
another results from astronomical observations, for example when errors in the measurement 
of a celestial position arise from the discrepancies between a real point in space and errors 
made in measurement. In applying the same curve to populations of men, what Quetelet did 
was to convert a fictive human mean into a real quantity (Hacking, 1990). One of the routes 
he took to this point was a study of the chest measurements of around 5000 Scottish 
regimental soldiers. Through these measurements he concluded that the distribution from 
measuring 5738 chests is analogous to the distribution resulting from one tailor measuring the 
same chest 5738 times; ‘we should be much embarrassed to state which series was taken from 
5738 different soldiers, and which was obtained from one individual with less skill and ruder 
means of appreciation’ (Quetelet in Hacking, 1990, p110).  
Quetelet’s conclusions, as Hacking points out, don’t make a great deal of sense but that 
did not prevent them fuelling an enthusiasm for plotting every sort of human, animal, 
vegetable, physical and finally moral attribute as if according to the law of errors. For C.S. 
Peirce (1998, p64) Quetelet’s success in applying the law of errors to biological and social 
matters is an illustration of the ‘great utility which fictions sometimes have in science’. By 
1878 when Peirce’s ‘The Doctrine of Chances’, was first published, he was already 
complaining of the frequent use of ‘the average man’ as a term designed to produce the 
‘appearance of exactitude where none exists’ (1998, p64). With Darwin clearly in mind, 
Peirce praised the way naturalists employed the idea of continuity to mark ‘the passage from 
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one form to another by insensible degrees’ (1998; p63). The trouble was the idea of continuity 
was so appealing it was being stretched to fit situations that have no continuity, such as, the 
average number of residents in a New York house.  
Peirce was marking just the beginnings of the trend towards social averaging which was 
to expand by the early twentieth century to a point which would surely have tested his 
famously volatile temper. The peculiarity of the idea that actual chests would vary in a pattern 
analogous to a tailor’s errors in measuring one chest, should not distract from the profound 
influence of social averaging techniques. The blurring in everyday usage of clear distinctions 
between terms like ‘average’, ‘mean’, ‘typical’ and ‘most’ went alongside a methodological 
mania for describing all manner of social phenomena in quantitative terms. This mania was 
one in which ‘statistical majorities, bell curves and impersonal data points came to structure 
America’s social imagination’ (Igo, 2007, p6). Statistical methods, Igo argues, helped ‘make’ 
a mass public but this was, in many respects, a continuance, not a divergence, from the 
foundational aims of statistics as a science designed to know the state and developed as a 
science of society.  
In relation to life assurance, Quetelet’s influence spread popular acceptance of the idea 
that laws determining all manner of individual human behaviour could be found. Quetelet’s 
index, now known as the Body Mass Index (BMI), provided an actionable means of human 
averaging. While within the industry, as French and Kneale (2009) explain, the use of BMI 
indicators to price premiums is relatively recent, the use of BMI technology to calculate and 
stabilise categories like ‘ideal weight’, ‘underweight’, and ‘obesity’ is long established. It 
makes perfect sense for an industry based on the pricing of mortality risks to be interested in a 
means of quantifying height/weight ratios against health risks but the BMI also offers a neat 
example of the challenge human statistical averaging poses. BMI data is not derived from the 
world population but from a sample and one skewed to a particular demographic context. The 
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BMI in the main is ‘derived from data obtained on Anglo-Saxon populations, [and thus] the 
generalizability and applicability of the BMI and its cut-off points to other populations has 
been questioned’ (Eknoyan in French and Kneale, 2009, p1045). BMI data is shaped by its 
context which means that the average generated reflects the biases of its own sample. Also, by 
definition, exceptions fare badly in quantitative averaging systems. In this case, healthy, 
muscular bodies can emerge with BMIs coded as obese when a qualitative appraisal would 
settle, without hesitation, in the other direction.  
This begins to suggest some of the difficulties posed by statistical objectivity. The 
diversity of biological and social phenomena just doesn’t lend itself, very completely, to 
statistical coding. Something is often left out or left over until explained by intuition, feeling 
or judgement. At an everyday level, this involves something akin to an intuitive smoothing or 
translation of statistical findings. Thus of course everyone knows that families don’t actually 
have 1.64 children, or in Peirce’s anachronistic example 14.72 persons living in the average 
New York house, or that rugby players aren’t really fat; its just that objective measurement 
has to generalise somewhat. But what precisely this ‘generalising somewhat’ actually leaves 
out can be difficult to spot in the enthusiasm for objectivity. The mundane smoothings over of 
statistics paradoxically also indicates the persistence, despite the triumphs of statistical forms 
of argument, of calculating without numbers.  
This innumerate calculating persists through the history of life assurance. Despite their 
promise as impeccably objective evidence, the promotional use of mortality tables did not 
produce the growth, or the mass expansion of markets, that a rather different form of 
averaging, one that had little to do with statistics, was to. An interesting way of thinking about 
some of the reasons why this might have been the case is offered by Gabriel Tarde’s 
reflections on statistics. Statistics play a central role in Tarde’s sociology, having been at one 
stage appointed Director of Criminal Statistics at the French Ministry of Justice, he had a 
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practitioner’s zeal in regard to the necessity of statistics. This zeal did not extend however to a 
commitment to the triumph of objectivity. In the re-enactment of his debate with Durkheim, 
Tarde remarks that if ‘one depends on statistics as an essentially ‘objective’ source of 
information one is deluding oneself. The oracles of this sibyl are often ambiguous and in need 
of interpretation’ (in Candea [ed.], 2010, p34). Part of Tarde’s point was that statistics’ 
potential was not then sufficiently developed to afford the definition of social facts that 
Durkheim had in mind. But Tarde also had an altogether more idiosyncratic, delicate and 
ambitious vision of statistical quantification than would be afforded by continuing 
development along the same lines. This was a vision which sought to resituate the intuitive 
and the metaphysical within statistics. The strength of a fully evolved statistics for Tarde 
would lie not in the purification from, but in the synthesis of, sensibilities. Only through such 
synthesis and through recognition of the symbolic character of the objective ‘facts’ of 
statistics could statistics be perfected as one of society’s ‘senses’ (Tarde, 1903; Didier, 2010). 
A more dynamic method, alert to processes and variations in individual patterns of belief and 
desire, was required to fully explain, smooth or translate what the figures of ordinary statistics 
really meant (Tarde, 1903; Barry, 2010).  
This is promising because Tarde’s take on statistics also informed his account of the role 
of sensibilities, passions and imitation in economic life. Society, for Tarde, is imitation and 
this places possession and acquisition at the centre of his inherently economic schema. Tarde 
recognised without opposition the quantifying, mathematizing tendency in economic science. 
The problem was not mathematizing per se but the restriction of economic quantification to 
mathematical calculation. As Latour explains; 
 
A judgement of taste, an inflexion in the way we speak, a slight mutation in our habits, a 
preference between two goods, a decision taken on the spur of the moment, an idea flashing in 
the brain, the conclusion of a long series of inconclusive syllogisms, and so forth – what appears 
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most qualitative is actually where the greatest numbers of calculations are being made among 
“desires” and “beliefs”. (2010, p154) 
 
While Tarde’s account may veer to the counter-intuitive, he nevertheless cogently 
documents some of the ground that is left out in clinging to statistics as an accurate measure 
of objective social facts. Gigerenzer et al. argue that in the end ‘probability served as a kind of 
protective belt for the hard core deterministic scientific program’ (1990, p283) providing 
subsidiary standards which helped underwrite the claims of less than perfect knowledge. In 
certain ways, nineteenth century statistics can also to be said to have acted as a protective belt 
for a social scientific program offering a way of making the existence of social facts credible. 
This protective belt has been productive but the eager reliance on certain forms of statistics 
has not been unproblematic. In the hard insistence on the objectivity of statistics, the ‘social 
facts’ revealed were sometimes stripped so bear of context as to be almost meaningless and 
sometimes treated as if a penchant for murder say, was the same sort of thing and could be 
analysed in the same sort of way, as the position of a star.  
In the next section I suggest that the life assurance industry found peculiar means to fill 
the gaps left by the excessive enthusiasm for statistics. If purified statistical averages in 
mortality tables did not quite hit the mark as what Tarde would call the ‘imitative rays’ 
necessary to prompt desire for life assurance, other means were found which did. In 
particular, insurance agents cast as good, average men acted to translate some idea of 
statistical averaging into a form that could prompt mass consumer imitation. 
 
Industrial agents and the cultivation of averageness  
As noted above, the life assurance industry had grown but not quite taken off by the 
middle of the nineteenth century. This was not for want of trying. De Morgan drew a 
derogatory parallel in 1838 between the ‘magnificent style’ of insurance prospectuses and the 
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insistent advertising puffs of blacking manufacturers bemoaning that even the ‘most eligible’ 
of insurance offices resorted to puffing (1838, pp10-11). Insurance companies were prolific, 
inventive marketers adept at mixed, experimental forms of marketing combining advertising, 
publicity and public relations machinery with networks of part-time, commissioned agents. 
The latter met with mixed fortunes; agents were both integral to the early development of the 
industry and the source of continual frustration to companies exasperated by the ‘steady 
rhythms of failure’ (McFall, 2009). While early agents notched up some successes, their 
accomplishments were to be dwarfed by those of agents working for a new breed of company.  
These new ‘industrial’ assurance companies drew inspiration from life offices, burial 
clubs and friendly societies in their efforts to target a gap in insurance provision for those 
members of the ‘industrious’ middle and working classes who survived by their own efforts. 
This was the preserve of companies like the Prudential, the Refuge and the Pearl, all set up 
between 1848 and 1864, using a system of agents not only to sell policies but to collect 
weekly premiums. In contrast to the slow trajectories of older life offices, the growth of 
industrial companies was spectacular. Thirty million policies were in force by 1910 (Morrah, 
1955) a figure which had risen to at least 67 million by 1940 (HMSO). It wasn’t simply that 
industrial companies caught a wave of expansion; their progress was no less impressive in 
relation to the rest of the market. Based on its ‘ordinary branch’1 premium income alone the 
Prudential went from nowhere in 1871 to become the largest British life insurer by premium 
income in 1890, holding the position in 1910 when, with 16.6 per cent of the market, it was 
almost four times the size of its nearest rival (Alborn, 2009). This flourishing of industrial 
assurance was in part a consequence of just how well agents were able to translate a 
quantitative, statistical product into a form that would engage passionate interests. 
The term ‘good, average man’ is taken from a Prudential Assurance District 
Superintendent’s Agent Record Book (PRU) where it featured frequently alongside variations 
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like ‘a good and I think, improved, man’ and ‘appearance satisfactory – a good man’ inked in 
red below the accounts derived from the agent’s ‘debit’ (Figure 2). The Record Book is a relic 
of a close supervisory system in which attitude, mood and appearance would be monitored 
and recorded alongside debit takings and new business written. Superintendents recorded a 
range of other remarks about agents – ‘depressed’, ‘scruffy’ ‘inclined to grumble’, ‘does not 
agree with wife’ even ‘seen smoking in the window without a coat on’ – which make it clear 
that agents judged ‘good, average’ were doing quite well. 
Figure 2 Prudential Agents Record Book 1910-11 (PRU) 
 
 
What is less clear is just how significant ‘good, averageness’ was to become to industrial 
assurance marketing. The average agent was already by 1910 becoming the central device in 
enrolling customers but the cultivation of averageness as a marketing quality was only 
beginning. Moreover, if the idea of an average man could trace its lineage back to Quetelet, 
the agent was also performing and translating averageness from a statistical concept to a 
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commonsense idea. Agents stretched beyond marketing in a restricted sense to act as a market 
device that ‘frame’ the market (Callon, Muniesa & Millo, 2007; McFall 2009b). In 
performing a cultivated averageness, they also worked as an ‘inscription device’ (Latour, 
1988) offering a visual corporeal display that helped translate some idea of a statistical 
average while at the same time summoning the sensibilities, beliefs and desires which 
motivate the purchase of insurance. Through this combination, agents helped transform the 
promise of insurance into a form calculable, not just by ‘any competent judge’, but by any 
prospective consumer. Consumers were enrolled into industrial assurance; it became, in many 
communities, a socially necessary thing to do and it inspired long-term, even inter-
generational, loyalty in ways that are wholly at odds with the comparative return on 
investment that industrial, as against ordinary life policies, or alternative savings schemes, 
offered. This was possible because through their agents, companies happened across a way of 
engaging the feelings and sensibilities as well as the financial calculations of their customers. 
In the remainder of the article I explore how the cultivation of agent’s averageness fed an 
imitative pattern of consumption. 
Often deliberately recruited as local men, industrial agents generally knew their 
communities well. They were exhorted to use this knowledge, to get to ‘know their books’ by 
developing their sensitivity to the daily rhythms, routines and relations of their customers. 
Agents who knew their books, knew family relationships and through the round of births, 
deaths and marriages, could identify prospects for new policies. But agents were also 
schooled in a form of salesmanship intended to enable them to enter such intimate turf 
without causing offence. Even quite early in the history of industrial assurance this involved 
cultivating a good, unobtrusive averageness. The Prudential Agent’s Record Book testifies to 
a preference for agents who were not too scruffy, too grumpy or too miserable but also who 
were not too flash, too ambitious or too clever. This preference is elaborated on in the agent’s 
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handbooks and companions of the period which feature extensive advice on how agents 
should comport themselves in the various situations they might encounter. 
Echoing the advice endlessly repeated in the insurance press, vade-mecums and 
companions of the nineteenth century, agents were encouraged to canvass as widely as 
possible at ‘every street, every door’ (Forrester, 1907). In practice, for industrial canvassers 
this meant a broad canvass in ‘decent working-class or middle or better class neighbourhoods’ 
with an explicit injunction against canvass in ‘very poor class neighbourhoods’ and a tacit 
understanding that there would be little point in canvassing the homes of the very rich 
(Forrester, 1907, pp 17-20). Open canvassing meant coaxing agents out of their local 
neighbourhoods to knock at doors in middle-class neighbourhoods. Such canvassing was 
important to industrial companies because it was necessary to build the lucrative ‘ordinary 
branch’ business based on higher value policies and remitted premiums. Middle-class 
business however was the acknowledged ‘bogie of the average industrial agent’; too nervous 
to canvass such homes effectively (Forrester, 1907, p40). In poorer but ‘decent’ areas, agents 
equally had to manage their ‘fit’ and were warned against displaying any hint of social 
condescension.  
The preferred solution to such social tensions turned upon the virtues of affecting a quiet 
unobtrusiveness and ‘such confidence in himself that he will never be embarrassed’ 
(Forrester, 1907, p15). Agents were exhorted to manage their selves; physically, emotionally, 
mentally and aesthetically. Depression and disappointment could be avoided by ‘keeping up 
the tone of the physical system … in winter, partake only of warm and invigorating food … it 
pays to dress well and feed plainly but carefully’ (Forrester, 1907, p15). By the 1930s the key 
Pitman handbook was offering more elaborate advice on how the agent could go about 
‘perfecting his personality’ (Sharpe and Taylor, 1936, p3). Acknowledging that agents were 
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individuals with distinctive personalities, agents were advised to ‘be just yourself’ but an 
improved self.  
 
[The] best business procured and retained is personality business, because the client is irresistibly 
drawn by the magnetic influence of the salesmen’s personality. The more perfect the 
development of the student’s own personality, the greater is his influence and attractive power. 
(Sharpe and Taylor, 1936, p4) 
 
The developed personality would be able to explain the technicalities of insurance and 
engender confidence that a policy tailor-made to suit the prospect’s needs was being offered 
by a sound office. The route to such successful salesmanship lay in nourishing all aspects of 
the personality; the emotional, intellectual and especially the physical and volitional. Agents 
‘obviously’ needed to be informed about insurance but less obviously they needed to deliver 
their messages in good voice; ‘the lips should open and close freely and the teeth too should 
be well separated. Practice in front of a mirror, you should be able to insert one finger 
between your teeth for the broader vowel sounds’ (Sharpe and Taylor, 1936, p17). Accents 
should not be completely hidden but ‘obvious provincialisms’ ‘slang’ or ‘journalese’ should 
be avoided.  
These vocal refinements were designed to insure agents could pass ‘without the slightest 
suspicion of familiarity with those in superior positions, or patronage of those whom you may 
think your inferiors’ (p25). In matters of dress too, agents should cultivate quiet, good taste 
avoiding ‘ill-chosen colours’ that might cause ‘the artistic sense of a female prospect to 
revolt’ but equally avoiding any hint of effeminacy (p90). Careful attention should be paid to 
personal hygiene; teeth, breath and hands should be well kept. Equally important, agents 
should conquer fear, shyness and anxiety and cultivate the right mental attitude. This meant a 
calm middle-ground, never presenting a ‘dejected attitude or miserable countenance’ but 
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equally avoiding excessive humour, high-spirits or forced optimism. A ‘genuinely cheerful 
disposition’ would require ‘cultivating so that it becomes a habit’ (p80-81). 
This salesmanship advice built up an idealised notion of the good, average agent and it 
simply echoed management and supervision practices also designed to foster these qualities. 
Agents’ techniques were closely monitored, they were often accompanied by inspectors, who 
would both offer feedback on how performance could be enhanced and virtuoso displays of 
how new business could be sold. When a good prospect for larger ordinary branch (OB) 
policy was identified, a specialist OB agent would go along to help close the sale. This was 
part of a fraternal sales culture which also featured formal sales dinners, award schemes and 
sporting events all designed to foster the ‘naturally cheerful’ healthy and robust personality a 
‘good man’ needed.  
Significant as the cultivation of a good sales personality was, the role of agents in the 
industrial business was not just about sales. In important respects, industrial agents were the 
product. As Lloyd George and Beveridge complained, agents were viewed as policyholder’s 
‘guides, philosophers and friends’ and were a formidable force in sustaining the market. 
When faced with complaints about the poor rate of return offered by industrial policies, the 
industry’s standard defence was that ‘home service’ was part of the product and that 
policyholders willingly paid extra for the service element (Nationalisation Box, PRU). In 
addition, the reassuringly average agent, as the twentieth century progressed, formed the core 
of many company’s marketing, and for one company in particular, branding, strategies.   
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Figure 3 1936 Prudential Advertisement (PRU) 
 
By the 1930s the agent, at the doorstep, at the garden fence or at the fireside was 
becoming an increasingly common theme in advertising and promotional materials. While 
‘injecting a little fear’ was already a well-established advertising strategy and while insurance 
offers huge scope for playing on fears of death and accidents, many companies often preferred 
instead to feature agent’s visits and reassuring, everyday, scenes. This tendency was taken 
further when the Prudential opted to turn the mildly pejorative phrase ‘the man from the Pru’ 
to its advantage. Following a Weekly Illustrated article on the work of industrial agents the 
Prudential’s publicity department experimented with adopting the phrase as a slogan. The 
studied average ‘Man from the Prudential’ went on to become an iconic visual brand for more 
than twenty years. The first ‘man’ was drawn from a real life agent, Fred Sawyer. Sawyer was 
a bit too heavy and scruffy to last as the model of the good, average, (as critiqued by the then 
Chancellor, Stafford Cripps) and was soon redrawn from another model, Mr Bradley, who 
was further anonymised to better represent a typical agent in 1965.  
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Figure 4 Men from the Prudential, Prudential Bulletin 1965 
 
As a visual brand the ‘man’ graced a wide range of advertising and marketing materials, 
sometimes centrally and sometimes as a corner logo. The ‘man from the Prudential’ was an 
ideal average, anonymous, respectable and safe even while reassuring customers that they, of 
course, were not average or anonymous to the company (See Figure 5).  
Figure 5 Men from the Prudential, Prudential Bulletin 1965 
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As a market device that not only marketed but was part of the product, the good, average 
agent worked to enrol customers and render life insurance calculable. Twentieth century 
industrial life marketing eschewed the mortality statistics of nineteenth century insurance 
promotion to focus instead on a way of capitalising on the idea of averageness that struck a 
chord with consumers’ emotional needs for safety, belonging and respectability. With 
anything up to 70 million policies in existence it is not difficult to imagine the role of 
industrial policies as a mark of social respectability in working-class communities that 
Johnson (1985) describes. Agents ‘fitted’ the needs of such communities and they fostered the 
imitative tendencies which made industrial insurance socially necessary. They were able to 
translate a statistical product and the statistical idea of averageness into a more palatable, and 
ultimately more calculable, form for consumers. None of this was pre-ordained, rather the 
story of industrial assurance is one in which the companies succeeded to the extent that they 
were able to react to the habits, desires and sensibilities of their customers. For a time, 
industrial agents were a good, reassuring average, by the end of the 1970s, commissioned 
market research identified them with seedy, backward looking harbingers of death, indelibly 
associated with the funerals on which their market was originally based (PRU). 
 
Final comments 
If this reads like a tortuous argument that statistics don’t matter when it comes to customer 
choice something has gone badly awry. Statistics absolutely do matter. As inscription devices 
statistics worked - long before the ascendance of SPSS (Uprichard, Burrows and Byrne, 2008) 
- as an intrinsic element in how society or ‘the social’ was known, and in what was known 
about it. Nevertheless in insurance marketing, statistics did not matter in quite the way early 
insurance companies hoped they might - as incontrovertible evidence, persuasive because 
objective. By themselves, statistics were not a persuasive marketing argument because they 
 31 
were not a calculable marketing argument - since the latter involves both more, and less, 
competence than statistical calculation.  
There may still be few competent to judge an applied mathematical argument but that, as 
the fallout from the financial crisis of 2007 continues to show, has not stood in the way of the 
rapacious development of mathematically modelled financial instruments of bewildering 
complexity. This is possible because consumers of derivatives like Credit Default Swaps do 
not calculate solely mathematically any more than industrial life assurance customers did. For 
both sorts of transaction, numbers are in, but not all, of the calculation. If agents, as good, 
average men, were able to convey a hint of the statistical knowledges underpinning insurance 
products, it was a hint germane to calculation. It was a hint of science, of progress, of safety 
in numbers. In explaining premium tables informed by mortality statistics, agents could, when 
required, assist consumers in making statistical calculations but this alone is not what made 
industrial insurance calculable. Calculability, for consumers, demands more than 
mathematics, it demands an insertion of the device, of the product, into the habits and traffic 
of everyday life. In their cultivated average-ness, agents offered the means of insertion, the 
means of making insurance applicable to conduct. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 ‘Ordinary’ branch premiums were not collected but remitted periodically companies like the Prudential and the 
Pearl offered both types. 
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